Cyber-security internals of a Skoda Octavia vRS : a hands on approach by Urquhart, Colin et al.
Date of publication xxxx 00, 0000, date of current version xxxx 00, 0000.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2017.DOI
Cyber-Security Internals of a Skoda
Octavia vRS: A Hands on Approach
COLIN URQUHART1, XAVIER BELLEKENS1, (Member, IEEE), CHRISTOS
TACHTATZIS2,(Senior Member, IEEE), ROBERT ATKINSON2,(SENIOR MEMBER, IEEE),
HANAN HINDY1,(MEMBER, IEEE) AND AMAR SEEAM.3,(Member, IEEE)
1Abertay University, Division of Cyber-Security, Dundee, Scotland
2University of Strathclyde, Dept. Electronic and Electrical Engineering, Glasgow, Scotland
3Middlesex University, Dept. Computer Science, Uniciti, Flic-en-Flac, Mauritius
Corresponding author: Xavier Bellekens (e-mail: xavier.bellekens@ieee.org)
ABSTRACT The convergence of information technology and vehicular technologies are a growing
paradigm, allowing information to be sent by and to vehicles. This information can further be processed by
the Electronic Control Unit (ECU) and the Controller Area Network (CAN) for in-vehicle communications
or through a mobile phone or server for out-vehicle communication. Information sent by or to the vehicle can
be life-critical (e.g. breaking, acceleration, cruise control, emergency communication, etc. . . ). As vehicular
technology advances, in-vehicle networks are connected to external networks through 3 and 4G mobile
networks, enabling manufacturer and customer monitoring of different aspects of the car. While these
services provide valuable information, they also increase the attack surface of the vehicle, and can enable
long and short range attacks. In this manuscript, we evaluate the security of the 2017 Skoda Octavia vRS
4x4. Both physical and remote attacks are considered, the key fob rolling code is successfully compromised,
privacy attacks are demonstrated through the infotainment system, the Volkswagen Transport Protocol 2.0
is reverse engineered. Additionally, in-car attacks are highlighted and described, providing an overlook
of potentially deadly threats by modifying ECU parameters and components enabling digital forensics
investigation are identified.
INDEX TERMS Cyber-Security, Digital Forensics, Physical Attacks, Privacy Attacks, Remote Attacks,
Reverse Engineering, Skoda Octavia
I. INTRODUCTION
THE average family car produced between the 1960’s -1980’s had limited electronics and technological sys-
tems installed. As technology advanced, the additions to
the ECU, remote central locking, CAN bus network and
electronic safety systems became standard [1], however, the
speed of technological advancement through mobile applica-
tions and increased communication services, to and from car
companies, has resulted in an increased attack surface and
security vulnerabilities. This is due to the lack of security
consideration for vehicular technologies and associated con-
nected systems [2].
In 2015, Samy Kamkar [3] [4] presented OwnStar an off-
the-shelf device, able to jam, store and replay key fob signals
of General Motors vehicle, hence, bypassing the rolling
code transmission. General Motors released an update to
avoid those types of attack later-on that year. In 2016, Keen
Security Lab successfully compromised a Tesla Model S [5].
The attack was achieved remotely and provided control over
the car, both in parking and driving modes. The car was
unmodified and running the latest firmware at the time. In
2017, Keen Security Lab successfully found numerous 0-day
attacks in the Tesla Model X [6].
While researchers have explored the security of vehicular
technology at various level, numerous car manufacturers
use legacy systems and are unable to update the security of
cars currently in circulation, nor are they able to control the
different attack vectors on cars running legacy systems (e.g.
infection through a rogue garage) [7].
With over 1.25 million Skoda Vehicles sold in 2018 [8], this
paper investigates legacy systems of the Skoda Octavia vRS
2017, while providing a global outlook on cyber-security
vulnerabilities and digital forensic elements of current vehic-
ular technologies. Exploring legacy vehicular technologies
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FIGURE 1. Skoda CANbus Overview
is critical, as a typical usage time frame for a car is of 5-
10 years [9], while the development time frame is around
3 to 6 years [9]. Moreover, vehicular manufacturer often
operates around the world, hence, delivering different system
to different continents based on user demand and require-
ments, i.e. pushing different software updates and rollouts
(e.g. infotainment systems may be different in China and the
EU) [9]. Finally, current code in vehicles accounts for over
10.000.000 lines of code, including 3rd party supplier code,
increasing the attack surface [9].
The contributions of this work are four fold:
• A Vehicular Security Testing Methodology is presented;
enabling to identify key components to test under vari-
ous circumstances.
• Vulnerabilities in Skoda Octavia vRS 2017 are explored.
• A Proof of concept algorithm reversing the VW TP 2.0
protocol to access and modify the ECU is provided, fur-
ther highlighting the danger of off-the-shelf remapping
devices.
• Components able to yield vehicular forensics informa-
tion are identified and presented.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows;
Section II provides an overview of the related work. Sec-
tion III highlights the investigation process followed in this
research, as well as, identifies a methodology for security
testing. Section IV demonstrates security vulnerabilities of
the current rolling code car fobs used by the vehicle. Further-
more, Section V highlights vulnerabilities in the infotainment
systems. Section VI explores the OBD-II port to modify
key parameters of the vehicle. Section VII demonstrates the
modification of the ECU through the OBD-II port. Moreover,
Section VIII provides an overview of useful components
for digital investigators. Finally, the paper concludes with
Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
Over the last couple of years, vehicular technologies have
been at the centre of attention with autonomous cars fully
embodying the Internet of Things (IoT) concepts, enabling
remote control of certain aspects of the cars such as heating,
the state of brake pads, remote locking, etc. . . . These fea-
tures have drastically impacted the attack surface of modern
cars. Leading to numerous flaws being uncovered over the
years. In 2013 Valasek et al. [10] published a manuscript
detailing vulnerabilities in Volkswagen vehicle immobilisers.
The paper discussed the reverse engineering of the device
and demonstrated that vehicles could be stolen without much
effort.
In 2014 Miller and Valasek [11] published the “Adventures
in Automotive Network and Control Units” confirming the
possibility for a remote attacker to execute code on a vehicle
Engine Control Unit (ECU). The authors detailed potential
modifications an attacker would be able to carry out remotely
on a Ford and Toyota test vehicle. The manuscript further
highlights critical parameters they were able to modify while
the car was in motion. These included, changing the steering
during auto park on the Ford and fooling the pre-collision
system into slowing down or stopping the car whilst in
motion on the Toyota.
In [12], the authors highlight the various vulnerabilities
within vehicles as well the cars various systems including
reverse engineering the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus
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FIGURE 2. Vehicular Security Testing Methodology
and ECU. The authors further highlight the possibility of
threats surrounding Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communica-
tion and signalling.
In [13], an overview of the security vulnerabilities with
modern key-less entry systems is provided. The researchers
successfully managed to gain access to a number of test
vehicles from the VW group. The paper detailed an attack
on the Hitag2 cryptographic key and provide a discussion on
cloning the remote control, resulting in the authors gaining
access to the vehicles.
[14] focuses on gaining remote access to the Volkswagen
Golf GTE and an Audi A3 e-tron vehicle. The authors
demonstrate some methods and tools used to gain access,
however, due to responsible/ethical disclosure, they do not
disclose all methods used to gain access to the vehicles.
When discovered, the vulnerabilities were raised to Volkswa-
gen which in turn reviewed the research paper and advised
that all the identified security vulnerabilities be subsequently
resolved in an update to the infotainment system.
As described, the attack surface in vehicular technologies
increases apace with the number of sensors and actuators de-
ployed. The next section provides an overview of the sensors
and actuators in the test vehicle presented in this manuscript,
furthermore, a methodology for testing the cyber-security
of vehicular technologies is presented alongside components
able to yield data in a digital forensic investigation based on
our cyber-security findings.
III. INVESTIGATION PROCESS
In this section, the vulnerabilities of the Skoda Octavia vRS
are highlighted. This manuscript focuses on end-user accessi-
ble interfaces, such as the key-fob, the infotainment system,
the On Board Diagnostic (OBD) interface and the ECU as
shown in Figure 1. These interfaces have been chosen, as they
are accessible by both end-users and mechanics, furthermore,
these interfaces can also be linked to connected off-the-shelf
devices for fault diagnosis. While this manuscript aims at
assessing vulnerabilities of end-user accessible interfaces,
we provide a generalised cyber-security testing model fully
transferable to other vehicular technologies.
A. CYBER-SECURITY TESTING MODEL
While vehicular technologies have specificities, they are also
composed of similar components. Generally, modern cars
include at least one short-range wireless communication,
provide the users with accessible interfaces such as OBD2,
the CAN interface or the ability to connect a phone to the
car through a USB. Furthermore, numerous cars have some
form of connectivity enabled, such as tracking through 3G
networks or have a browser integrated to the infotainment
systems. Furthermore, all cars have an ECU and feature sen-
sors such as oil gauge, breaking pads wear sensors, etc. All
these characteristics are presented within the methodology in
Figure 2. The method aims at identifying the attack surface.
Step I) Define Vehicular Space: identifies the vehicle based
on the context space; as an example, a refrigerator truck
will have different sensors than a garbage truck. Step II)
Short Range Wireless: defines the attack surface based on
all sensors using short-range wireless technologies such as
433MHZ, Bluetooth, etc. Step III) Accessible User Interface:
enables to list all the accessible user interfaces, ranging from
accessible ports on the car as well as the infotainment system
and USB ports. Step IV) Internet Access: allows to iden-
tify all connection points to the internet within the vehicle,
including the software that allows to browse the internet.
Step V) Sensors and Autonomy: provides an opportunity
to list Lidars and other sensors the car uses to drive and
autonomously navigate areas.
This methodology was used to identify the attack surface
for the Skoda Octavia vRS. In this manuscript, the short-
range wireless system was considered, more specifically the
key fob. Different user interfaces were also considered, such
as the OBD II port, the connected devices, the ECU and the
Infotainment systems. Finally, the Internet Access was tested
through the Infotainment system and the Web browser. The
Skoda Octavia did not include any Radar or Lidar, however,
different sensors were altered through the User Interface
(OBD II Port).
IV. KEY FOB EXAMINATION
One of the most integral aspect to any car has always been
the key fob, yet the method for unlocking vehicles has
largely remained unchanged since the development of key-
less entry, with the exception of moving from a “fixed" code
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FIGURE 3. Rolling Code Overview
to a “rolling" code. Fixed code, re-use the same code over
the longevity of the key, whereas rolling code, changes the
code each time the key and the car communicate. Figure 3
illustrates the sequence of a rolling code transmission.
In this section, the feasibility of a replay attack against
rolling code enabled key fob is investigated. This attack when
executed correctly is highly effective and has been demon-
strated by thieves on surveillance camera [15], however, to
the best knowledge of the authors, a hands-on approach has
never been documented. This section demonstrates this attack
in details and is achieved in three distinct steps; Step I) A
noise/jamming signal with the aim of blocking communi-
cations between the car and the key when the legitimate
user presses a button (e.g. open car, close car) is created.
Step II) A Software Defined Radio (SDR) peripheral is used
to record the communication between the key fob and the
car, including the rolling code. Finally, Step III) The device
replays the rolling code obtained from the key fob to the car.
In the United Kingdom, keys operate at a frequency of
434MH, to this end the SDR receiver ix tuned to 434.3MHZ.
Figure 4 shows that transmissions between the key fob and
the car are recorded between 434.383MHz and 434.466MHz.
FIGURE 4. GQRX Frequency Confirmation
FIGURE 5. Key Fob Signal Modulation
Following the tuning of the SDR receiver, the signal be-
tween the key fob and the car is captured. Figure 5 shows the
modulation of the signal.
The signal in Figure 5 is shown to incorporate an Ampli-
tude Shift Keying (ASK) for the transmission, specifically
On-Off-Keying (OOK). This form of modulation works as
follows; each “on" pulse is categorised as a "1" while each
“off" pulse represents a "0". In order to fully capture the
key fob signal, it is necessary to introduce noise, in order
to prevent the car from accurately recognising the transmis-
sion. This is achieved by developing an algorithm for the
YARDstick One. The YARDstick One, is a low speed USB
transceiver, which enables to capture and record transmission
under 1GHz.
Algorithm 1
1: x = “define frequency"
2: w = “define channel width"
3: l = “define packet length"
4: set frequency to x
5: set width to w
6: set modulation
7: set modem rate
8: set the data which is sent on the channel
9: set packet length to l
10: set max TX power
11: start transmitting
12: take input to stop the signal
13: print “completed"
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FIGURE 6. Noise Goal
Algorithm 1 displays the pseudocode to create a wide
channel of noise. This enables to generate a transmission
of sufficient width at a frequency of 434MH, forbidding the
receiver to accept the transmission. Furthermore, this crucial
step ensures that the key fob is not de-authenticated during
the process.
Figure 6 shows the noise created. As seen, the noise band
is large enough to cover the transmission width of the key
fob. Whilst the noise is being transmitted, GNU Radio is used
to capture the Raw IQ data from the transmission, filter the
noise signal and replay the transmission to the car.
Figure 7 shows GNU Radio configured with a sample
rate of 2e6, with the frequency set for 434.3m Hz. This
configuration, enables both to capture the key transmission,
but also to generate the background noise as well as re-
transmit the signal from the key fob afterwards.
Options
ID: top_block
Generate Options: WX GUI
Variable
ID: samp_rate
Value: 2M
osmoncom Source
Device Arguments: hackrf
Sample Rate (sps): 2M
Ch0: Frequency (Hz): 434.3M
Ch0: Freq. Corr. (ppm): 0
Ch0: DC Offset Mode: Off
Ch0: IQ Balance Mode: Off
Ch0: Gain Mode: Manual
Ch0: RF Gain (dB): 10
Ch0: IF Gain (dB): 20
Ch0: BB Gain (dB): 20
WX GUI FFT Sink
Title: FFT Plot
Sample Rate: 2M
Baseband Freq: 0
Y per Div: 10 dB
Y Divs: 10
Ref Level (dB): 0
Ref Scale (p2p): 2
FFT Size: 1.024k
Refresh Rate: 15
Freq Set Varname: None
WX GUI Waterfall Sink
Title: Waterfall Plot
Sample Rate: 2M
Baseband Freq: 0
Dynamic Range: 100
Reference Level: 0
Ref Scale (p2p): 2
FFT Size: 512
FFT Rate: 15
Freq Set Varname: None
File Sink
File: /tmp/vrsRX
Unbuffered: Off
Append ﬁle: Overwrite
FIGURE 7. vRSRX
FIGURE 8. Signal and noise capture
It is important, however, to note that the signal captured
contains the background noise generated, hence it is critical,
to filter the signal captured. As shown in Figure 8 the car
would be unable to recognise the valid transmission due to
the background noise. It is, therefore, necessary to filter the
noise down prior to replaying the key fob transmission as
highlighted in red in Figure 8.
In order to filter down the signal, the captured signal is
fed into a Low Pass Filter (LPF) allowing to adjust the cut-
off frequency as well as the transition width. This procedure
enables to identify the valid signal transmitted by the key fob.
Furthermore, the transmission power is increased (i.e. Radio
Frequency (RF) and Intermediate Frequency (IF) gains).
Allowing to re-transmit the signal to the car and gain full
access to the vehicle.
The method presented allows to by-pass to rolling code of
the Skoda vRS key-fob and gain full access to the vehicle.
This method can be used against all Skoda range, with the
exception of keyless entry which relies on RFID, the method
has also been confirmed to work against the Kia Venga, Volvo
v40 and Ford Focus, demonstrating the importance to build
security-by-design within the automotive industry.
V. INFOTAINMENT SYSTEM
The Skoda Octavia vRS offers multiple accessible user inter-
faces, such as the Modular Infotainment System (MIB). The
system was updated for the 2017 Octavia model and features
the QNX Operating System (OS) running the Amundsen
satellite navigation and online infotainment, additionally also
runs Apple Car Play. Figure 10 shows the architecture of the
operating system.
Options
ID: top_block
Generate Options: WX GUI
Variable
ID: samp_rate
Value: 2M
Low Pass Filter
Decimation: 1
Gain: 1
Sample Rate: 2M
Cutoff Freq: 250k
Transition Width: 250k
Window: Hamming
Beta: 6.76
WX GUI FFT Sink
Title: FFT Plot
Sample Rate: 2M
Baseband Freq: 0
Y per Div: 10 dB
Y Divs: 10
Ref Level (dB): 0
Ref Scale (p2p): 2
FFT Size: 1.024k
Refresh Rate: 15
Freq Set Varname: None
WX GUI Waterfall Sink
Title: Waterfall Plot
Sample Rate: 2M
Baseband Freq: 0
Dynamic Range: 100
Reference Level: 0
Ref Scale (p2p): 2
FFT Size: 512
FFT Rate: 15
Freq Set Varname: None
WX GUI Slider
ID: cutoff
Label: cutoff
Default Value: 250k
Minimum: 2k
Maximum: 1M
Converter: Float
WX GUI Slider
ID: trans
Label: trans
Default Value: 250k
Minimum: 2k
Maximum: 1M
Converter: Float
File Source
File: /tmp/vrsRX
Repeat: Yes
osmoncom Source
Device Arguments: hackrf
Sample Rate (sps): 2M
Ch0: Frequency (Hz): 434.3M
Ch0: Freq. Corr. (ppm): 0
Ch0: RF Gain (dB): 47
Ch0: IF Gain (dB): 47
Ch0: BB Gain (dB): 20
Throttle
Sample Rate: 2M
Multiply Const
Constant: 6
FIGURE 9. vRSFilter and TX
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Architecture
The QNX OS shown in Figure 10 presents a low attack
surface. From a red-team perspective, the mobile device
gateway, the browser application and the SQL database are
the most obvious components. To carry out the reconnais-
sance phase, the infotainment system was connected to a
private WiFi network in order to simulate a compromised
connection. The infotainment system was then scanned with
Sparta – a port scanner. Sparta highlighted a number of open
ports as shown in Figure 11.
The open ports were probed for responses. All ports were
tested using the NetCat. Port 25010 responded with XML
schema and a "go away message" as shown in Figure 12.
While connection to the port was unsuccessful, it is expected
that the port is waiting for a specific request in order to return
meaningful data.
Amongst the other ports investigated, port 15361 re-
sponded to the NetCat requests with information from the
infotainment system. The information included the current
vehicle speed, GPS location, phone book contact details from
the connected iPhone, call history and current mileage-shown
in kilometres. This information was provided without authen-
tication requirements. Furthermore, the data was provided in
plain text, raising privacy concerns.
Listing 1 provides information of interest, it is, however,
FIGURE 11. Open Ports
FIGURE 12. Connection attempt of port 25010
important to note that some information has been redacted
due to privacy concerns. Additionally to the information
displayed in the listing, the information included the address
of a distant server, as well as data provided by directly Apple
Car Play when an iPhone was connected to the infotainment
system including the entire call history i.e. dialled numbers
as well as missed calls. It also included the current track
which was selected on the iPhone (not playing at the time).
Obtaining this information also suggests that Apple Car Play
provides full read access to the phone.
The investigation also highlighted vulnerabilities in the
infotainment system. When scanned with Metasploit, a me-
terpreter command shell was gained as shown in Figure 13
demonstrating the poor security of the system. The meter-
preter shell could subsequently be used to execute commands
on the infotainment system and potentially create a backdoor
or gather more data.
A. WEB SERVER
Included in the infotainment system is a Web Browser al-
lowing the user to visit the web and load pre-programmed
web-pages. A directory listing was run against the car, the
web-server and the web-browser to find hidden directories.
• 49101/info
• 49101/rc
• 49101/rc/info
• 192.168.1.150/info
The information obtained through the directory listing was
substantial. The QNX OS web-server was found to have dis-
coverable web pages and directories as shown in Figure 14.
The following path “192.168.1.150/info", provided an
XML Schema, with information relating to sub-directories.
As shown in Figure 15 and Figure 16 using the information
returned from the different path it was possible to browse
to specific sections listed in the XML schema. The pages
contained plain text information relating to specific request.
The information retrieved included GPS Location, Speed,
etc, similar to the information gathered in Listing 1.
The infotainment system demonstrated numerous vulnera-
bilities accessible by an attacker, yielding private and con-
fidential information about the users and the car, raising
concerns about end-users privacy.
VI. ON BOARD DIAGNOSTICS PORT
The On-Board Diagnostics (OBD-II) is part of the accessible
user interfaces and has been standard in vehicles since 1996.
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1 6 : 0 5 : 0 2 . 3 0 1 [ I n f o ] [ iMX6 . WLAdapter . t s d . wladap ] Adapte . BT{_}APPL{_}PIM{_}DATA{_}IND : p a r s e {_} s t a t u s =0 ( s u c c e s s ) ,
o b j e c t { \ _} done =1 , d a t a (117 )=BEGIN :VCARD . . VERSION : 3 . 0 . . FN : T*m A**m . . N:A**m; T*m . . TEL ; TYPE=CELL: 0 7 7 6 5 * * * * * 7 . . TEL ;
TYPE=HOME:01**4 8 * * * * 5 . .END:VCARD
1 6 : 0 5 : 0 5 . 4 4 0 [ I n f o ] [ iMX6 . Navi . t s d . mibs td2 . psd . v15 . s h o r t r a n g e . L inkTree ]
VehPos o f f r o a d 56 .2****4 −3.72****8 , 0 cm / s , con f : 1000
1 6 : 0 5 : 1 1 . 5 7 9 [ I n f o ] [ iMX6 . onlineVHR .OSVHR] [ PID =532558 TID= 5] [OSVHR] CarcomBapKm r e c e i v e d from CarCom wi th c u r r e n t Mi leage =11580
1 6 : 0 7 : 2 9 . 8 1 7 [ I n f o ] [ iMX6 . WLAdapter . t s d . wladap ] Adapte . BT{_}APPL{_}PIM{_}DATA{_}IND : p a r s e {_} s t a t u s =0 ( s u c c e s s ) ,
o b j e c t {_} done =1 , d a t a (144 )=BEGIN :VCARD . . VERSION : 3 . 0 . . FN
: S t *** r t W** t e . . N:W** t e ; S t *** r t . . TEL ; TYPE=CELL: 0 7 7 4 * * * * * 7 1 . .X−IRMC−CALL−DATETIME ; MISSED:20171106 T130835 . . END:VCARD
1 6 : 0 7 : 4 8 . 1 9 1 [ I n f o ] [ iMX6 . ASR . a s r . e n g i n e ] Contex tManager : embedGues tContex t ( ) Phone . Speech . ContactNames
1 6 : 1 8 : 5 6 . 0 9 9 [ I n f o ] [ J5e . Radio . System ] Car speed = 0
Listing 1. Information Provided by Port 15361 Upon Connection
FIGURE 13. QNX Shell
The OBD-II port is not only a diagnostic interface but also
a Controller Area Network (CAN) interface. Typical, CAN
packets are 8 bytes in size, however, when necessary larger
packets using the Transport Protocol (TP) are being used. The
standard TP in use is the ISO-TP (ISO 15762-2), however,
vehicles in the Volkswagen and Audi Group (VAG) use their
own protocol which is known as VW-TP 2.0 (ISO 14230-
3). Additionally, the vRS is fitted with a CAN gateway
module which resides prior to the OBD-II port and ensure the
exchange of data between the various bus systems. By using
the VW-TP the VAG group ensures that no traffic capture is
possible through the OBD-II port. Traditionally, a malicious
user would connect the USB2CAN or a CANtact to the OBD
port to obtain information and capture the traffic.
When trying the same approach on the Skoda Octavia
vRS, a negative response is returned by the system as shown
in Figure 17. This is due to the VW-TP 2.0 protocol. The
protocol requires various parameters to be configured prior to
any data being released, crucially the Gateway Module (GM)
will only allow specific data requested to flow to the OBD-II
port.
In this section, we present a proof of concept method to
gain access to the data of the CAN bus. In order to communi-
cate with it. It is crucial to open a channel, to allow data to be
exchanged. Through reverse engineering the communication,
it was discovered that this was achieved by sending CAN ID
0x200 with the following data 1f c0 00 10 00 03 01 packet.
The command starts the setup with the control unit. Using
further reverse engineering techniques, it was possible to
highlight the crucial timing to send the command. In fact,
without respecting a specific timing in between commands
FIGURE 14. Web Page on Port 49101
FIGURE 15. Car Information Provided by Port 49101 under the /info/ directory
resulted in a connection drop.
Figure 18 shows the CAN data obtained on the Skoda vRS.
The proof of concept enables to capture live data on the bus
and obtain data such as the engine speed. Figure 19 provides
the speed of the car whilst in motion (in red) recorded at 48
miles per hour.
While this method enables to capture live data from the
system such as diagnostic information, the proof of concept
also enables to modify parameters and inject commands.
There is a number of tools provided by VAG available for
garage mechanics to diagnose faults by accessing the OBD-
II port and collecting CAN data, two of these tools are the
Snap-On SOLUS Scan Tool and the Ross-Tech VCDS. Both
authenticate with the gateway module/ECU and are able to
retrieve data and modify parameters. While both tools are
publicly available and can be used to change parameters in
the vehicle, both have prices ranging from £200 to £350. The
algorithm provided within this manuscript provides similar
access to the CAN bus.
Furthermore, the CAN bus accessible through the OBD-II
VOLUME 4, 2016 7
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FIGURE 16. Car Information Provided by Port 49101 Under the /rc/info
directory
port enables to modify central components of the car such
as the automatic start-stop feature. Using the CAN Gateway
and selecting adaptation, the automatic start-stop feature was
disabled, without displaying any error message to the user.
Disabling this feature requires to modify the “IDE08348-
Start/stop voltage limit" from 7.5v to 12.1v resulting in
a failure of the system to operate. Similarly, this can be
achieved using the VCDS system as shown in Figure 20.
As the voltage is below the 12.1V level when the car is
started the automatic start/stop is permanently disabled with
no error message visible to the user. The lack of authentica-
tion on the OBD-II port can lead to malicious users modi-
fying the behaviour of the car. For example, the OBDEleven
device, a snap-on device which connects to the OBD-II port
and allows for full system diagnostics, as well as monitoring
FIGURE 17. vRS CAN Data; Negative Response Frame
FIGURE 18. vRS CAN data; Proof-of-Concept Communication with the CAN
Bus
and the ability to change parameters. The OBDEleven differs
from devices through its small form factor. When connected,
the device is invisible to the driver and works with Bluetooth
in conjunction with an Android application.
The OBDEleven device was also used within this
manuscript alongside a LG Nexus 5 to demonstrate its ef-
ficacy as a malicious device and highlight the strong require-
ments for authentication on OBD-II ports. The OBDEleven
FIGURE 19. vRS Speed
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FIGURE 20. VCDS Voltage limit adjusted
allows for example to activate the reverse mirror dip with a
single click. Furthermore, it is also possible to enable and
configure "high beam assist" on the Skoda vRS, which if
ordered from Skoda at a cost £315. While these examples are
trivial, the device was also capable of configuring the info-
tainment system to allow access to the engineering (green)
menu where it was possible to view configurations and
modify the debugging destinations which are not visible to
the public. To access this menu the following procedure was
followed: I) Once connected, the “Control unit" was selected
and changed to “Change Service". II) “Developer Mode"
was then selected from the options. III) Once complete the
root menu was then accessed and “adaptions" selected and
“Developer Mode" was enabled and applied. IV) After the
configuration was complete on the OBDEleven the menu
button on the infotainment system was held in for 5 seconds
providing access to the “Service mode" menu. V) from there
“Testmode" and “Green Engineering Menu" were selected
allowing access to the Engineering menu.
FIGURE 21. Engineering Menu
Figure 21 and Figure 22 highlight options to change the
debugging destination to a USB drive, including logs of the
vRS. Additionally, it is possible to configure the menu to
provide networking logs, phone logs and the VW Default
logs, including information about the state of the car and its
connection status with VAG further highlighting security and
privacy concerns.
VII. ELECTRONIC CONTROL UNIT
The Electronic Control Unit (ECU) is controlling vital as-
pects of the vehicle including the fuel to air mix, turbo boost
pressure, etc. . . . The ECU is another accessible user interface
of the vehicle. Over the years, different tuning of the ECU
has appeared. ECU tuning is commonly referred to as Chip
tuning - Chipping was the process of physically removing
the ECU from the vehicle, open the ECU in a controlled
environment, using a K-tag tool to connect to it, as well as
configure the pin out/probes to connect to specific connection
locations within the ECU. While this method is effective,
it is time consuming and requires physical access to the
ECU. Additionally, this method also presents a greater risk
of damaging the ECU. A more practical option is to tune the
ECU through the OBD-II port, however, as the Skoda vRS
employs the VW-TP 2.0 protocol, modifying the ECU is not
as straight forward as on other vehicles.
In this section, the process of chip tuning is described,
furthermore, we highlight the risks and possible adverse
effects chip tuning may have on the vehicle if achieved by
a malicious user. In this section, we also demonstrate how
chip tuning can be achieved using off-the-shelf tools.
The most common chip tuning application, is the pro-
cess of changing the driving parameters, also referred to,
as “remapping". Remapping consists of taking a reading of
the processing chip within the ECU which stores the engine
map, contained within the map are details on boost pressure,
ignition, throttle position, fuel pressure, etc. . . .
Remapping the ECU can be achieved through readily
available tools such as CMDFlash OBD and WinOLS. CMD-
Flash is a flash programmer which supports various pro-
tocols including EOBD K-Line, as well as, EOBD CAN
Bus amongst others. WinOLS is an application for Windows
which is capable of searching for engine maps within the
ECU. The tool is able to successfully modify parameters
in order to change the map/behaviour of the vehicle. It is
possible to modify parameters by entering specific values or
by modifying a 3D map/visual representation of the engine
power delivery.
To change the map of the engine it is necessary to connect
FIGURE 22. Debugging Menu
VOLUME 4, 2016 9
Urquhart et al.: IEEE ACCESS
Fuel Quantity (RPM, EGT)/mg/cyc
1/min 0 551 1250 1750 2016 2499 3000 3500 4000 4500 5200
500 1000 1500 1900 2247 2750 3250 3750 4250 4800
500 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 39.60 48.00 54.00 56.00 54.75 53.50 52.50 51.75 51.00 50.00 49.50 48.00 47.00 44.00 39.00 32.00 0.00
900 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 39.60 48.00 54.00 56.00 54.75 53.50 52.50 51.75 51.00 50.00 49.50 48.00 47.00 44.00 39.00 32.00 0.00
1000 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 39.60 48.00 54.00 56.00 54.75 53.50 52.50 51.75 51.00 50.00 49.50 48.00 47.00 44.00 39.00 32.00 0.00
TABLE 1. Power Delivery Text Based Interface
FIGURE 23. Original Power Delivery
the CMDFlash tool to the OBD-II port, once the CMDFlash
identified the model of vehicle as the vRS the ECU data is
downloaded and saved. The ECU data can then further be
used by WinOLS.
WinOLS provides a range of modification options, ranging
from graphical interface to a visual modifier. Table 1 high-
lights the text-based interface. In this section, we modified
the torque limiter, both through the 3D model and through
the text-based interface.
The 3D model available provides a visual representation of
the current power delivery method in the engine. The original
power is shown in Figure 23.
As shown in Figure 23 the power delivery peaks at over
1900 Revolutions Per Minute (RPM), the torque then reduced
until 3250rpm where the reduction becomes much more
pronounced (i.e. 4000rpm) the performance drop-off forces
a gear change due to the degradation. Using the 3D model,
the area post 1900rpm until 4500rpm can be highlighted
allowing for the selected area to be modified (increased or
decreased), affecting the overall performance of the vehicle
as shown in Figure 24.
Adjusting the power delivery post 1900rpm creates a
much more usable and evenly distributed powerband which
changes the driving characteristics of the vehicle. Addition-
ally, the 3D model also allows visualising the comparison
between the original parameters and the modified ones as
shown in Figure 24.
While remapping the engine is often used to improve
the drivability of the vehicle, an infected computer, or and
infected tool could lead to detrimental effects both to the
FIGURE 24. Modified Power Delivery
engine and possibly the user.
Once modified, the changes were uploaded to the ECU
through the OBD port. The car was then placed on a "rolling
road" to measure the performances. The engine alteration
is displayed in Figure 25. The results represent the power
at the wheels, rather than at the flywheels (e.g. The car
demonstrates 184bhp at the flywheel, however only 159.56
Bhp at the wheels).
The modification of the ECU lead to a recorded gain of
32 break horsepower at the wheels and a torque increase
of 45Nm, furthermore, the remap also lead to an additional
7mpg savings. While this experiment demonstrates the ben-
efits of remapping, a malicious script can easily alter the
performances of the car during remapping and cause serious
damage to the car, the engines and the occupants. Further-
FIGURE 25. Remap Result Comparison
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FIGURE 26. OBD plug and play device increasing the car performance
more, it is now possible to find "plug-and-play" devices
claiming to increase the performance of the car as shown in
Figure 26.
Throughout our study, half a dozen plug-and-play devices
sold by unknown sellers have been identified, while these
may well increase the performance of the car, they could
also dramatically deteriorate the car performances and be
used to infect the car with a malware, or into performing an
unwanted action. It is therefore essential to be able to identify
components that may have been tempered with.
VIII. VEHICULAR FORENSIC COMPONENTS
In light of the different vulnerabilities and Vehicular Security
Testing methodology proposed in this manuscript, numerous
components holding key information about the state of the
car have been identified. This section highlights components
of the vehicles, containing data that can be used during a
digital forensic investigation.
Figure 27 lists a number of the components holding key
data digital forensic investigators can use to investigate a
crime within the automotive industry. Furthermore, data can
be located using the Car Security Testing Methodology pre-
sented in Figure 2, starting with the identification of the
vehicular technology under investigation. An Informative list
of components is presented hereafter to facilitate the location
of data in vehicular technologies.
A. INFOTAINMENT FORENSICS
Modern infotainment systems contain numerous information
about the users including Bluetooth ID from paired phones
and phones that may have tried to connect. Information
such as call logs, can also be found, even when Android
Auto or Apple Car play are not enabled. The Infotainment
system also contains information on the music files Pictures
such as thumbnails that can have been accessed through the
infotainment system. Voice data can also be recovered on
some models when the “Voice Control" commands have been
activated. This information can be crossed-examined during a
forensic investigation to provide historic details on the usage
of the vehicle.
B. GPS FORENSICS
Global Positioning System (GPS) and Glonass and Galileo
data can be used to find the last location driven, including
last destinations and stops made by the vehicle in locations it
stopped.
C. ECU FORENSICS
By removing the ECU or accessing data through the OBD-
II port, forensics investigators can retrieve information such
as the mileage readings, the Vehicle Identification Number
(VIN) & Serial Numbers. This information can be used to
formally identify the car. Furthermore, a History of faults,
the time they were triggered, and their mileage at the time
of trigger. Some vehicles also allow for crash data to be
recovered alongside a history of resolved faults and events,
such as the brakes information (i.e. where the brakes applied,
what light was turned on, etc. . . ). The ECU also contains
external memory, than can be interfaced with I2C or SPI,
to obtain information. The ECU might also contain a JTAG
interface, or a UART that might be accessible.
D. KEY FOBS FORENSICS
Modern key fobs contain numerous information about the car
such as the VIN number, the transponder ID, or the number
of keys associated with the vehicle and the ID of the key.
Some vehicles also store the last mileage readings, the fuel
status of the car and vehicle data such as historical faults, and
crash data.
The information provided by the different components of
the car during a digital forensic investigation can help answer
key question after a crash or a crime and help digital forensic
investigators to uncover the speed of the car, the angle of
the steering wheel, the time and impact (i.e. from the back
or the front) or information about the Automatic Collision
Notification (ACN) system.
IX. CONCLUSION
Vehicular technologies are evolving rapidly with embedded
connection and self-driving modules. While the range of
services increases for the end-user, these modules drastically
increase the attack surface. There has been little documented
research on the cyber-security aspects of vehicular tech-
nologies currently on the road. In this manuscript vehicular
security testing methodology was presented, enabling cyber-
security researchers to identify key components of vehicles.
This methodology was subsequently used to evaluate the
cyber-security of a Skoda Octavia vRS. The key fob was
demonstrated to be vulnerable to rolling code by-pass at-
tacks enabling a malicious user to get access to the vehicle.
Furthermore, it was demonstrated that when accessed the
infotainment system was yielding private user information,
that the system was vulnerable to exploit, that information
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FIGURE 27. Skoda Octavia vRS Sensors
relating to the speed and location of the vehicle was also
exposed. In this manuscript, the OBD port was also inves-
tigated. The VW TP 2.0 protocol was reversed engineered,
enabling a malicious user to gather information about the
system, such as the speed of the vehicle, furthermore, the
proof-of-concept also enabled to modify key elements of the
vehicle such as the start-stop feature. Moreover, the ECU
was investigated through the OBD-II port. It was demon-
strated that the behaviour of the car could be altered and the
danger of off-the-shelf OBD-II ECU remapping devices was
highlighted. Finally, key components of the car containing
key data about the vehicle were identified for digital forensic
investigators to investigate.
While the security investigation focused primarily on the
Skoda Octavia vRS 2017, the methodology provided is
generic and applied to all types of vehicles. Furthermore, all
elements and security weaknesses identified, may be repli-
cated on other vehicles. Finally, the components identified
for digital forensic investigation described in this manuscript
are present in all modern vehicles. It is, therefore, crucial to
improve the security of vehicular technologies to ensure the
physical security of the occupants, while essential to provide
digital forensics investigator with data to investigate crash in-
formation or crimes committed using vehicular technologies.
Future work should focus on the security and digital forensic
investigation of vehicles compliant with the latest UNECE
WP.29 standards, the virtualisation of ECU components as
well as V2X communications.
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